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Abstract: In this study, I investigate publicly traded firms that relocate corporate headquarters 
and measure the Chief Executive Officers’ role in the location choice and performance 
implications of the move. Specifically, I examine whether CEOs that are moving corporate 
headquarters closer to their Alma Maters’ city (“suspect move”) are acting in the best interest of 
shareholders or are fulfilling self-serving motives. I perform two sets of analyses on a sample of 
firms that have relocated headquarters to a new state. First, I test whether the probability that a 
move is suspect increases when CEOs appear to have undue influence and entrenchment relative 
to shareholders. Second, I test whether, relative to non-suspect moves, suspect moves are 
positive or negative for shareholders. I find little support for CEOs influencing firm decisions 
and boards to make a suspect move. However, I do find support that suspect moves are 
negatively associated with shareholder value. In supplemental tests I document preliminary 
evidence that CEO distraction explains the relative decrease in shareholder value for firms that 
undertook a suspect move.  
____________ 
*Advisor: Dr. James Chyz 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper I examine corporate headquarter relocations that are potentially associated 
with CEOs’ self-interested motives. Specifically, in a sample of recent corporate headquarter 
relocations by large publicly traded companies, I compare firms that move to the state of the 
CEO’s Alma Mater (i.e. “suspect moves”) against a control sample of firms that do not appear to 
be suspect. CEOs that oversee a corporate headquarter relocation to the state where they went to 
university potentially have self-serving motives. With this sample I empirically test two research 
questions: First, are governance characteristics associated with the decision to engage in a 
suspect move? Second, relative to control firms, do suspect move firms suffer from poor 
financial performance subsequent to their headquarter move? 
To answer my research questions I perform two sets of tests. I begin the first set of tests 
by quantifying variation in CEOs influence and entrenchment for my sample firms. To determine 
how much influence a CEO could have on the decision to relocate, I use a measure of CEO 
centrality developed by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) i.e. the CEO pay slice that is 
captured by the total pay of the CEO relative to the total pay of the next 4 most highly paid 
executives. I then examine the entrenchment of firms’ management and CEOs using the 
entrenchment index (E index) from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). The E index is based on 
six Investor Responsibility Research Center provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers 
and charter amendments. Entrenchment increases when the CEO has little threat of being 
replaced, allowing the CEO to put his interests ahead of the firms. The results of these initial 
tests do not provide any consistent evidence that the likelihood of a suspect move increases in 
CEOs influence and entrenchment.  
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In my second set of tests I examine whether financial performance suffers subsequent to a 
suspect move. I use return on assets (ROA) as a measure of accounting performance and the 
market-to-book value ratio (MTB) as a measure of market performance. I collect performance 
data for up to three years before and after move to see whether the suspect move was in the best 
interest of the firm and its shareholders. A suspect move creates a shareholder’s dilemma. The 
move could result in a more relaxed environment for the CEO so he/she will perform better. At 
the same time, suspect moves could be associated with self-serving motives that could lead to 
negative performance. My results support the latter and suggest that a suspect move is associated 
with a relative decrease in performance.  
In supplemental analysis I extend my performance tests to try and begin to understand the 
source of decreased performance subsequent to suspect moves. There are a number of potential 
sources for this decreased performance including distance from the old headquarters to new 
headquarters and potential distractions coming from being closer to the CEO’s Alma Mater. A 
distraction would arise if the CEO is spending time involved with the university in some 
academic or athletic capacity thus spending more time out of the office. In exploratory univariate 
tests, I document evidence consistent with CEO distraction. Specifically, I document a higher 
rate of CEO affiliation with one of the major three athletic conferences: SEC, Big 12, Big 10, for 
the sample of suspect move firms.  
My study furthers what is known about corporate headquarter relocations’ effects on 
financial performance. According to Pirinsky and Wang (2006), companies often say that 
headquarter relocations allow them to gain from being closer to their customers or suppliers. 
Cronqvist (2012) shows that CEOs’ personal motives can help explain corporate financial 
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behavior. Along the lines of Cronqvist (2012) my study adds a personal motive, instead of a 
business motive, for headquarter relocation that prior papers have possibly ignored.  
Due to years of past legislation and activist investors’ actions, corporate governance 
characteristics have become more uniform across firms. It may not be all together surprising that 
the governance characteristics of my control group and suspect move firm group show little 
variation across these groups. Despite these similarities, I still find that firm performance suffers 
subsequent to a suspect move. My study is therefore useful to policy makers and corporate 
boards as it suggests that nominally good corporate governance can still be associated with bad 
firm outcomes in certain contexts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the second section, I place my study 
in the context of the existing literature; in the third section, I describe the data; in the fourth 
section, I discuss the empirical and additional analysis results; in the fifth section, I summarize 
the findings and conclude.   
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 A considerable amount of research has examined determinants of headquarter relocations 
and the impact of CEO personal traits and self-serving motives on corporate outcomes. 
Similarly, a substantial amount of research has examined implications of corporate governance 
on firm performance. Much less research has been done on the interplay of these areas. To the 
best of my knowledge, my study is the first to examine the implications of CEO self-serving 
motives with respect to corporate governance and firm performance in a headquarters relocation 




A corporate headquarter relocation is defined as a physical headquarters move from one 
city to a different city. Two options are typically available for multi-nationals: select a new city 
in their home country or select a new city abroad. In headquarter relocations abroad, Voget 
(2010) finds that international taxation plays a key role in determining the relocation country. To 
minimize this effect my study focuses only on domestic moves of US based companies, i.e. the 
selection of a new city in the continental US.  
With respect to factors that influence the choice of a new domestic headquarters location, 
Holloway (1991) finds that corporations look to place themselves in a diversified economic base 
which is one that is less reliant on manufacturing. This would allow corporations easier access to 
their needed services: accountants, lawyers, and bankers. This suggests that headquarters are 
more likely to relocate to larger cities where these expert services are more densely located.  
Davis (2008) further supports the idea of locating headquarters in cities with many 
services offered while further suggesting that headquarters will cluster together to better 
understand the market. This would also allow for knowledge sharing between companies and 
easier access to one another. This phenomenon is known as “agglomeration”. Almazan (2010) 
supports the theory that firms will relocate to place themselves in an industry cluster and Strauss-
Kahn (2008) finds that firms’ headquarters are in-fact concentrated and the agglomeration effect 
is statistically significant. Ghosh (1995) finds that headquarter relocations from agglomerated 
cities results in cost-savings that positively impacts a firm’s financial performance and Almazan 
(2010) finds that corporate headquarter location is important because it affects growth 
opportunities in firm’s financial decisions. Loughran (2008) found that one of the financial 
decisions that location affects is equity issuance and Pirinsky and Wang (2006) finds that a 
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firm’s headquarter location affects the firm’s value by affecting its stock movement. This 
research generally suggests that headquarter moves can have performance and shareholder value 
implications.  
CEO Personal Traits and Self-Serving Motives: 
Many studies have found that CEOs’ individual traits and characteristics are meaningful 
for firm outcomes. Without singling out individual traits or characteristics, Bennedsen (2008) 
finds that specific CEOs matter and managers affect firm performance. Further supporting this, 
Chyz (2013) and Cronqvist (2012) both find that CEOs’ personal behaviors can partially explain 
corporate financial behavior. Chyz (2013) finds that “suspect executives’’, defined as those that 
evade personal taxes, companies are more likely to partake in tax sheltering. Cronqvist (2012) 
finds that executives’ personal leverage levels affect the leverage structure of their companies.  
Other empirical evidence shows that certain CEO traits can affect a firm negatively. Malmendier 
and Tate (2005) show that a CEO’s overconfidence leads to value-destroying M&A activity 
which usually lead to increases in CEO bonuses. This prior literature generally suggests that 
CEOs personal tendencies and preferences can impact business decisions and that CEOs often 
engage in self-centered or self-serving business decisions. I consider a headquarter move to the 
Alma Mater state as another self-serving decision that potentially has firm governance and 
performance implications.  
CEO Influence and Entrenchment and Corporate Governance: 
Jensen (1976) defines an agency relationship as a contract under which principals, 
investors, engage an agent (i.e. the CEO) to perform services on their behalves and delegate 
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decision making authority to this agent. The investors cannot fully trust the CEO so corporate 
governance mechanisms are used by investors to monitor agents and align the interest of agents 
with their interests. CEOs’ decisions are supposed to maximize the investors’ welfare but 
sometimes the CEO will seek to maximize his own utility. Thus, shareholders need to create 
mechanisms to protect against potentially self-serving decisions and consumption of 
“perquisites” by managers to benefit themselves (Jensen, 1976).  La Porta (2000) defines 
corporate governance as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation of the firms’ assets by the managers (CEOs) they have hired. Masulis 
(2007) and Manne (1965) find that poor corporate governance likely leads to decisions that are 
not necessarily in the best interest of shareholders. Consequently, corporate governance 
mechanisms, if working properly, should limit CEO influence and entrenchment relative to 
shareholders to decrease the chances that CEOs take actions and decisions for self-serving 
reasons.   
Hypothesis Development: 
As noted above, if functioning properly, corporate governance mechanisms protect 
investors and will reduce the chances that CEOs make decisions that are self-serving. Self-
serving decisions are more likely to occur if CEOs have greater influence and entrenchment 
relative to shareholders. I expect suspect moves to be a consequential and self-serving decision. 
Less influential and entrenched CEOs face greater scrutiny by the Board of Directors and any 
suspect moves should be rejected. This leads to my first testable hypothesis which is as follows:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The likelihood of a suspect move is negatively associated with CEOs’ 
influence and entrenchment.  
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I may not be able to document support for H1 for a number of reasons. First, variation in 
CEO influence and entrenchment is difficult to measure empirically. Second, stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms can be publicly perceived as good but still allow a poor decision to be 
made. Fisman (2013) finds that a well governed company can allow a CEO to become 
entrenched giving him/her more power to make a poor decision. It is also possible that the 
Boards know a proposed move is closer to the CEO’s Alma Mater but the CEO convinced them 
that the move would be good for the firm. As a result, it is not clear whether strong corporate 
governance would mitigate self-serving headquarter moves in all instances. Regardless of the 
results of my test of H1, suspect moves have potential firm performance implications which I 
discuss below.  
The general consensus (Strauss-Kahn 2008, Ekholm 2001, Duranton 2005) is that firms 
want to be located near an abundance of services and other headquarters. These two theories 
focus largely on optimal relocations from a business viewpoint. Strauss-Kahn (2008) suggests 
that while headquarter moves are infrequent, they are not rare.
1
 Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
expect that some headquarter moves are driven, in part, by CEOs’ self-serving motives. In fact, 
Ghosh (1995) documents evidence of some corporate moves ostensibly for self-serving motives. 
Specifically, Ghosh (1995) documents that when management’s decisions serve their self-
interest for luxurious offices equity markets react negatively. The negative equity market 
reaction results because the agent (CEO) is not acting in the principals’ (investors) best interest 
and is potentially destroying value. Suspect moves are potentially self-serving at the expense of 
shareholders, are suboptimal from a business perspective, or are a combination of both. This 
leads to my second hypothesis:  
                                                          
1
 Strauss-Kahn (2008) states the rate of relocation is significant at approximately 5% within a 5 year timeframe. 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): Relative to control firm headquarter moves, suspect headquarter moves are 
negatively associated with firm performance. 
The finding in Ghosh (1995) that equity markets react negatively to certain relocation 
reasons suggests that shareholders are aware of and differentially price headquarter moves. 
Although I expect suspect moves to be driven by self-serving motives and are not in the best 
interest of shareholders, it is not unreasonable to believe a suspect move could improve financial 
performance. For example, the CEO could now be in his comfort zone after moving to his Alma 
Mater state so he is happier and more productive at work. Lyubomirsky (2005) finds that happy 
individuals are more successful at work. The CEO could also reconnect with old university 
friends that allow the firm to identify more business opportunities and contract more efficiently 
thus helping growth and prosperity. Cronqvist (2012) finds that a CEOs’ personal behavior can 
help explain the firm’s financial behavior which would support the hypothesis that a CEO’s good 
personal life would lead to a firm’s good financial health. Nevertheless, to the extent a suspect 
move is self-serving I expect it to harm financial performance and firm value.  
3. Data and Research Design 
Sample 
 My sample consists of 89 public firms and covers the years 2001-2012 as seen in Table 1. 
My primary data source for headquarters moves is Corporate Library. I search the Corporate 
Library database which provides detailed annual historical information on, among other things, 
firms’ headquarter locations. To be viable in my analysis I need CEO names in order to identify 
Alma Maters and firms that moved corporate headquarters. Corporate Library returned 167 firms 
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with the CEO name and state of the headquarter move for my initial sample. Based on minimal 
data requirements some observations had to be removed including firms not covered in the 
financial databases for year of move, firms without financial information to construct regressors 
for at least one year before and after the move, lack of university information for CEO, a CEO 
affiliation with a foreign university, and the move being to an existing subsidiary or because of 
M&A. My final sample consists of a reasonable balance of 68 control firms and 21 suspect move 
firms.   
Additional data sources for my empirical analyses include ExecuComp (CEO centrality, 
executive compensation information) and Compustat (ROA, MTB, and other financial 
information). Tests of H1 and H2 use different empirical approaches and thus result in different 
sample compositions. For instance, tests of H1 focus on only one year while tests of H2 capture 
up to three years before and after headquarter moves. This results in a pooled sample of 513 
firm-years for tests of H2 representing 89 unique firms. Because of the annual nature of the test 
and the difficulty in obtaining the needed governance data, my final sample of unique firms for 
tests of H1 vary between 66 and 56 depending on the measure used. 
Research design 
To test H1 I use a logit regression of suspect moves against the measures of CEOs’ 
influence and entrenchment (captured by CEO centrality and E index) and a set of controls to 
create Model (1):  
SuspectMovei  = α0 + β1(CEO Influence and Entrenchment)i + βνXi + ei  
 
SuspectMove  = A move to the state of the CEO’s Alma Mater 
Influence and Entrenchment are defined as:  
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ADJCPS = Industry mean-year adjusted CEO pay slice, where the CEO pay 
slice is defined as total CEO compensation divided by the total 
compensation of the top five named executives based on Bebchuk, 
et al. (2011) 
EINDEX = Entrenchment index based on Bebchuk, et al. (2005) 
 Control variables: 
SIZE_AT  = Natural log of total assets 
 LEV   = Sum of current and long-term debt divided by lagged total assets 
LNAGE = Natural log of the number of years the firm appears in 
Compustat database 
 ROA    = Pretax income less special items divided by lagged total assets 
 MTB   = Market value of equity divided by book value of equity  
 A positive and statistically significant coefficient on β1 would provide support for H1 that 
predicts suspect moves are associated with CEO influence and entrenchment.  I measure 
influence and entrenchment using two proxies. The first is the E index consistent with Bebchuk, 
et al. (2005). The E Index captures variation in the entrenchment of firms’ management and is 
also a proxy for overall governance quality. As first discussed by Manne (1965), high 
entrenchment could potentially harm shareholders suggesting entrenched CEOs are more likely 
to make decisions for self-serving motives. The second is the industry adjusted CEO Pay Slice 
(ADJCPS), where the CEO Pay Slice is defined as in consistent with Bebchuk et al. (2011). The 
CEO Pay slice is the fraction of aggregate compensation of the firm’s top-five executive team 
that the CEO captures. CPS allows me to see how much power the CEO has in comparison to the 
other top executives in the firm. Bebchuk (2011) finds evidence that higher CPS is associated 
with agency problems and suggests that CPS can be a product of governance problems. 
Consistent with Mande and Son (2012) I adjust the CPS for industry affiliation by using the 
deviation from the annual industry averages in construction ADJCPS.  
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To test H2 I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) difference in difference regression of 
firm performance on suspect move firms and post move time period indicators and a set of 
controls to create Model (2): 
Performanceit = α0 + β1SuspectMovei +β2PostMoveit + β3SuspectMovei * PostMoveit +  
βnXit + ΣIndustryi + Yeart + eit 
Performance:   
ROA    = Pretax income less special items divided by lagged total assets 
MTB   = Market value of equity divided by book value of equity 
Indicator variables: 
SuspectMove = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is associated with a 
suspect move (i.e. a move to the state of the CEO’s Alma Mater) 
PostMove =Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years after a headquarter 
move and zero otherwise 
Control variables: 
SIZE_AT  = Natural log of total assets 
 LEV   = Sum of current and long-term debt divided by lagged total assets 
LNAGE = Natural log of the number of years the firm appears in 
Compustat database 
 RND   = Research and development expenses scaled by lagged assets 
 Industry  = Industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 12 
 Year   = Year fixed effects 
 
A negative and statistically significant coefficient on β3 would provide support for H2 
that predicts suspect move firms, comparative to control firms, will see worse performance after 
a suspect move. Performance is measured using the proxies return on assets (ROA) and market-
to-book value ratio (MTB) which measure accounting performance and market performance, 
respectively. In general, Ghosh (1995) finding that management’s self-serving decisions are 
received by equity markets negatively supports my hypothesis that accounting and market 
performance will lower due to a self-serving decision by the CEO to make a suspect move.   
Sample descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for H1 and is separated by all firms, control 
firms, and suspect move firms. Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all firms in the 
sample. The mean for ADJCPS is 0.006 while the mean for EINDEX is 2.313. In Table 2, Panel 
B presents the statistics for the control firms and Panel C presents the statistics for the suspect 
move firms. The results of these analyses show that, on average, CEO centrality is actually lower 
for suspect sample firms but this difference is not statistically significant. The EINDEX is higher 
for suspect move firms which would support my hypothesis but this difference is not statistically 
significant. For my control variables, only firm size (SIZE_AT) and profitability (ROA) are 
statistically different between suspect move firms and control firms. Suspect move firms appear 
to be smaller on average and are more profitable on average. 
Table 3 presents industry composition based on Fama French 12 (French 2011) of the 
sample used in my H2 testing. The table shows the number of firm-years used for each control 
and suspect move firm by industry. Generally speaking, there appears to be a reasonable 
distribution of industries across both control and suspect move firm samples. To further control 
for time-invariant industry characteristics on my results, these industry classifications are used 
for industry fixed-effects in tests of H2.  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for tests of H2 and separately presents the 
pooled sample of firm-years, control firm-years before and after move, and suspect firm-years 
before and after move. Table 4, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of 
pooled firm-years.  Table 4, Panels C and E present firm-year descriptives for periods after the 
headquarter move for control firms and suspect move firms respectively. Table 4, Panels B and 
D present firm-year descriptives for the period before the move.  
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Comparing Panels B and C it appears as though control firms become more leveraged 
(i.e. 0.331 vs. 0.278) after the move. No other changes for control firms are statistically 
significant.
2
 Importantly, ROA appears to increase (i.e. -0.002 vs. 0.017) and MTB appears to 
decrease (i.e. 3.393 vs. 2.781) after the move for control firms, but again, these changes are not 
statistically significant.  
Table 4, Panels D and E provide preliminary support for H2 that performance suffers 
after a suspect move. Specifically, I find statistically significant decreases in both ROA (i.e. 
0.060 vs. 0.034) and MTB (i.e. 4.455 vs. 1.761) after a suspect headquarter move. Of the control 
variables, only leverage (LEV) and size (SIZE_AT) are statistically different between before and 
after move time periods. The former suggests that suspect move firms de-lever and increase in 
size subsequent to a move.  
4. Regression Results 
Tests of H1 
Table 5 presents the regression results of Model (1). Model (1) seeks to capture whether 
the suspect move decision is related to CEO influence and entrenchment. Influence and 
entrenchment is measured by two variables: ADJCPS and the EINDEX.  Columns (1) and (2) 
present the results with the measure ADJCPS while columns (3) and (4) present the results with 
the measure EINDEX. Columns (1) and (3) present the results without ROA and MTB while the 
other two columns include these variables. For both measures, my variable of interest is 
Influence and Entrenchment and neither returns a statistically significant result. The only 
                                                          
2
 LNAGE is statistically different across the periods for both control and suspect move firm, but this result is trivial 
since age naturally increases over time.  
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significant result is the control variable size (SIZE_AT) which is negative. These results show 
that H1 cannot be supported through empirical analysis. This potentially means, due to more 
uniform corporate governance mechanisms, that it is difficult to capture variation in CEO 
influence and entrenchment.    
Tests of H2 
Table 6 presents the regression results of Model (2). Model (2) seeks to capture relative 
changes in firm performance after a headquarter move. Column (1) represents ROA and column 
(2) represents MTB. In both of the columns, the dependent variable of interest that supports the 
hypothesis is SUSPECT * PostMove which captures after the move financial performance for 
suspect move firms relative to control firms. The relationships between SUSPECT * PostMove 
and ROA is negative (-0.061) and significant at a 1% level and MTB is also negative (-2.310) 
and significant at a 10% level. The negative relationship between ROA and the control variable 
leverage (LEV) can be expected because highly levered firms may be financially constrained due 
to high amounts of interest. ROA also has a negative relationship with the control variable 
research and development (RND) which can be expected because firms with high RND 
expenditures tend to be younger, high-tech start-ups that are not profitable at all. These 
regression results for H2 support my hypothesis by showing that a firm who engages in a suspect 
move will have worse financial performance after the move compared to before the move than a 
control firm. 
Additional Analysis Results 
Supplemental univariate tests 
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 Results for tests of H2 suggest firm performance suffers subsequent to a suspect 
headquarter move relative to a non-suspect headquarter move. There are a number of potential 
sources for this decreased performance. One possibility is distance from the old headquarters to 
new headquarters. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that stock returns have a significant 
geographic component. Another is potential distractions coming from being closer to the CEO’s 
Alma Mater. A distraction would arise if the CEO is spending time involved with the university 
in some academic or athletic capacity thus spending more time out of the office. I undertake 
some exploratory univariate tests to search for evidence of either cause and document results of 
these tests in Table 7.  
In Panel A I examine the role of distance to determine if it affects performance after a 
suspect-move. Both measures in miles, Log of Distance and Distance, show that suspect move 
firms and control firms were relatively similar. On average, suspect move firms did not move as 
far as control firms (i.e. 901 vs. 1023) with a difference of 122 miles. The Log of Distance was 
also relatively similar (i.e. 6.545 vs. 6.554) with a difference of 0.009. Neither of these 
differences is statistically significant which suggests it is unlikely that distance is the cause of 
decreased performance for suspect move firms.  
In the United States, Division I college athletics plays a vital role in college students’ 
experiences and connects them to campus and the city. Therefore, college football and basketball 
games are a main draw to bring alumni back to campus and the city. In Panel B I search for 
evidence of possible sources of CEO distraction by examining the role of college athletics. Panel 
B suggests that CEOs from the 3 Big Football Conferences (i.e. SEC, Big 10, and Big 12) are 
more likely to move firm headquarters to their Alma Mater’s state than CEOs from Division I 
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without Big Football Conferences and All Division I Athletics. Specifically, of all suspect 
moves, there is a higher proportion to SEC, Big 10, and Big 12 schools than the control groups 
move proportion to the same group of schools. The difference between suspect and control firms 
is statistically significant at a 10% level. This suggests a CEO who oversaw a suspect move and 
went to a Big Football Conference university is potentially distracted by his university’s football 
and basketball teams’ performances.  
5. Conclusion 
 This paper examines CEOs’ influence and entrenchment effects on new headquarter 
location along with the relocation’s effects on financial performance. I examine both potentially 
self-serving suspect moves to the CEO’s Alma Mater state and control, or non-suspect, moves. I 
use CEO Pay Slice to help determine a CEOs’ influence that originates from Bebchuk, Cremers, 
and Peyer (2011) and the EINDEX to measure entrenchment that originates from Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). I find little evidence to suggest that CEOs’ influence or entrenchment 
results in undue sway on the new headquarter locations. Because suspect headquarter moves are 
potentially self-serving, this suggests that some corporate governance mechanisms within these 
firms moderate CEO influence and entrenchment.  
 I extend my first set of findings into a difference in difference analysis that compares 
changes in performance after headquarter moves for suspect move firms and my control group. 
Because I expect that a suspect move is self-serving in nature I predict that a suspect move leads 
to worse financial performance after the move when compared to a control firm. My empirical 
results support this assertion as I find that both accounting performance and market performance 
decreases for suspect move firms relative to control firms. This is important because it shows 
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that headquarter relocations do not always guarantee positive financial returns that CEOs, and 
the firm Boards, hope will occur. My results suggest it is more likely for the returns to be 
negative if the move is determined to be suspect. 
In an effort to explain these results, I find that firms with CEOs who attended a university 
within a Big Football Conference were more likely to move headquarters to their Alma Maters 
than CEOs from Division I without Big Football Conferences and All Division I Athletics. These 
results, though exploratory in nature, provide findings that suggest CEOs are pursuing self-
serving motives. They pay more attention to their universities’ football and basketball teams 
instead of their firms. There are still other aspects of my setting that I have not addressed in this 
research study. Nevertheless, my findings provide evidence that CEOs’ self-serving decisions are 
not only possible, but destructive to shareholder value. My study provides a warning to corporate 
boards about the need for appropriate corporate governance mechanisms that protect firm and 
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Sample Construction  
 
Panel A: Sample Construction 
Unique Corporate Library Database firms with CEO name and  
state headquarter move  
167 
     Less:  
        Firms not covered in financial databases for year of move (31) 
        Moves to an existing subsidiary or because of M&A: (5) 
        Firms lacking university information for CEO: (13) 
        Firms where all CEO university affiliations are foreign: (4) 
        Firms without information to construct regressors for at  
        least one year before and one year after the move 
(25) 
     Firms in sample 89 
  
Suspect move firms  21 
Control firms 68 
This table presents my sample selection procedure. I begin with firms available on the Corporate Library database which collects 




H1 Sample Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
 
Panel A: All sample firms used in main regression testing 
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ADJCPS 66 0.006 0.126 -0.055 -0.006 0.081 
EINDEX 56 2.313 1.292 1.500 2.000 3.000 
SIZE_AT 89       7.470*** 1.592 6.430 7.335 8.357 
LEV 89 0.271 0.238 0.083 0.237 0.352 
LNAGE 89 2.840 0.759 2.250 2.740 3.597 
ROA 89     0.011** 0.176 -0.008 0.034 0.068 
MTB 89 4.211 10.022 1.530 2.311 4.166 
       
Panel B: Control sample firms  
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ADJCPS 50 0.014 0.126 -0.074 0.002 0.083 
EINDEX 44 2.250 1.314 1.000 2.000 3.000 
SIZE_AT 68 7.651 1.729 6.452 7.518 8.724 
LEV 68 0.280 0.249 0.078 0.248 0.372 
LNAGE 68 2.862 0.751 2.250 2.707 3.637 
ROA 68 -0.003 0.197 -0.016 0.028 0.064 
MTB 68 3.765 9.019 1.535 2.357 4.154 
       
Panel C: Suspect move sample firms  
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ADJCPS 16    -0.020 0.126 -0.054 -0.022 0.044 
EINDEX 12     2.542 1.233 2.000 2.000 4.000 
SIZE_AT 21     6.886*** 0.820 6.296 6.999 7.453 
AVG_LEV 21     0.242 0.204 0.148 0.231 0.293 
LNAGE 21     2.771 0.797 2.250 2.740 3.511 
ROA 21     0.055** 0.064 0.009 0.047 0.072 
MTB 21     5.656 12.908 1.383 2.036 4.166 
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample of firms used in testing H1. All variables measured as the average of 
realizations in the two-years prior to the move year. Panel A presents the pooled sample. Panel B presents control firms and 
Panel C presents suspect move firms. ADJCPS is the industry mean-year adjusted CEO pay slice, where pay slice is 
defined as total CEO compensation divided by the total compensation of the top five named executives. EINDEX is the 
entrenchment index based on Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). SIZE_AT is the natural log of total assets. LEV is the 
sum of current and long-term debt divided by lagged total assets. LNAGE is the natural log of the number of years the firm 
appears in the Compustat databse. ROA is pretax income less special items divided by lagged total assets. MTB is the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. *, ** and *** next to the mean indicate a 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively, significant difference between suspect move and control firms using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 3  
H2 Sample Industry Composition 
 
Panel A: Industry Composition – Fama French 12 for H2 Testing 
 Control Suspect  
 Number Percent Number Percent Percent Diff 
Consumer Nondurables 21 5.3 0 0.0 5.3 
Consumer Durables 0 0.0 6 5.0 -5.0 
Manufacturing 70 17.8 24 20.0 -2.2 
Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction and Products 12 3.1 6 5.0 -1.9 
Chemicals and Allied Products 18 4.6 12 10.0 -5.4 
Business Equipment 52 13.2 26 21.7 -8.5 
Telephone and Television Transmission 0 0.0 6 5.0 -5.0 
Utilities 18 4.6 0 0.0 4.6 
Wholesale, Retail and Some Services 30 7.6 16 13.3 -5.7 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 54 13.7 6 5.0 8.7 
Financial Services 40 10.2 12 10.0 0.2 
Other 78 19.8 6 5.0 14.8 
 393  120   
This table presents industry composition based on the 12 industry classifications defined by Fama and French (French 







































H2 Sample Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
 
Panel A: Pooled firm-years used in regression testing 
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ROA 513 0.017 0.129 0.001 0.033 0.067 
MTB 513 3.099 4.678 1.314 2.177 3.450 
SIZE_AT 513 7.571 1.636 6.515 7.430 8.509 
LEV 513 0.285 0.260 0.088 0.241 0.386 
LNAGE 513 2.936 0.722 2.398 2.833 3.638 
RND 513 0.003 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Control firm-years BEFORE headquarter move 
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ROA 198 -0.002 0.150 -0.015 0.030 0.061 
MTB 198 3.393 4.278 1.527 2.498 3.930 
SIZE_AT 198 7.613 1.778 6.360 7.530 8.846 
LEV 198 0.278 0.235 0.081 0.240 0.409 
LNAGE 198 2.833 0.784 2.197 2.708 3.638 
RND 198 0.006 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Panel C: Control firm-years AFTER headquarter move 
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ROA 195     0.017 0.132 -0.003 0.030 0.074 
MTB 195     2.781 4.696 1.180 2.096 3.428 
SIZE_AT 195     7.843 1.763 6.570 7.963 9.058 
LEV 195     0.331* 0.310 0.113 0.256 0.469 
LNAGE 195     3.069*** 0.617 2.565 2.944 3.714 
RND 195     0.002 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel D: Suspect firm-years BEFORE headquarter move 
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ROA 61 0.060 0.080 0.016 0.051 0.078 
MTB 61 4.455 7.060 1.354 2.185 3.874 
SIZE_AT 61 6.824 0.827 6.296 6.882 7.430 
LEV 61 0.248 0.216 0.060 0.236 0.307 
LNAGE 61 2.741 0.821 2.079 2.708 3.526 
RND 61 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel E: Suspect firm-years AFTER headquarter move 
 Obs. Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ROA 59     0.034** 0.048 0.017 0.034 0.063 
MTB 59     1.761*** 1.137 1.230 1.761 2.422 
SIZE_AT 59     7.301*** 0.927 6.698 7.245 7.964 
LEV 59     0.191* 0.155 0.081 0.154 0.303 
LNAGE 59     3.044** 0.630 2.565 2.944 3.664 
RND 59     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of firm-years used in testing H2. All variables are annual measures. 
Panel A presents the pooled sample. Panels B and C partition the control firms-years before and after the headquarter 
move. Panels D and E partition the suspect firm-years before and after the headquarter move.  ROA is pretax income less 
special items divided by lagged total assets. MTB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
SIZE_AT is the natural log of total assets. LEV is the sum of current and long-term debt divided by lagged total assets. 
LNAGE is the natural log of the number of years the firm appears in the Compustat database. RND is research and 
development expense (set to zero if missing) divided by lagged total assets. *, ** and *** next to the mean indicate a 10%, 





























This table presents Logit regressions results for tests of H1. Influence and Entrenchment in columns (1) and (2) is captured by 
ADJCPS. In columns (3) and (4) Influence and Entrenchment is captured by the ENINDEX. The dependent variable, SUSPECT, is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if firm moved headquarters to the state affiliated with the CEO’s Alma Mater and zero otherwise.  All 
variables measured as the average of realizations in the two-years prior to the move year and are as defined in Table 2. P-values are 
reported under each coefficient in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively using a two-




















 ADJCPS EINDEX 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Influence and Entrenchment -5.372 -6.641 0.259 0.263 
 (0.14) (0.09)* (0.37) (0.37) 
SIZE_AT -1.145 -1.136 -0.558 -0.567 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.10)* (0.11) 
LEV -0.069 0.550 0.887 1.636 
 (0.98) (0.82) (0.64) (0.44) 
LNAGE 0.569 0.520 -0.114 -0.191 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.84) (0.75) 
RND -3628 -3200 -1080 -497 
 (0.16) (0.29) (0.57) (0.82) 
ROA - 5.529 - 8.501 
 - (0.33) - (0.17) 
MTB - -0.109 - -0.134 
 - (0.43) - (0.32) 
Intercept 5.867 5.821 2.464 2.511 
 (0.02)** (0.03)** (0.31) (0.36) 
     
Psuedo R
2
 0.2311 0.2477 0.0903 0.1269 
Nobs 66 66 56 56 
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TABLE 6  

























This table presents OLS regression results for tests of H2. SUSPECT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm moved headquarters to 
the state affiliated with the CEOs Alma Mater and zero otherwise. PostMove is an indicator variable equal to 1 for periods after the 
headquarter move and zero otherwise. All other variables as defined in Table 3. All regressions include year and industry fixed-effects 
based on the 12 industry classifications defined by Fama and French (French 2011).  Amounts in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
White (1980) standard errors clustered by firm. *, ** and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5% and 1%, 























Dependent variable ROA MTB 
 (1) (2) 
SUSPECT 0.080 0.941 
 (2.97)*** (0.64) 
PostMove 0.020 -0.318 
 (1.17) (-0.41) 
SUSPECT * PostMove -0.061 -2.310 
 (-2.65)*** (-1.82)* 
LEV -0.118 -2.489 
 (-2.21)** (-1.29) 
SIZE_AT 0.016 -0.105 
 (2.04)** (-0.42) 
LNAGE 0.000 -0.833 
 (0.02) (-1.57) 
RND -0.010 -0.028 
 (-3.28)*** (-0.64) 
   
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.34 0.39 
Nobs 513 513 
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TABLE 7  
Supplemental Univariate Tests Examining Mechanisms Behind Suspect-Move Performance 
Decreases  
 




















This table presents a series of univariate tests examining mechanisms behind the decrease in performance post suspect-move. Panel A 
presents tests for the role of distance and compares the distance in both miles and the log of miles between suspect and control firm 
moves. Panel B presents tests for the role of large college athletics on suspect move choice. The row labeled “Big Football 
Conferences” captures the proportion of the CEO Alma Maters that are members of the big three NCAA football conferences, i.e. 
SEC, Big 10, and Big 12. The row “Division I without Big Football Conferences” captures the proportion of CEO Alma Maters that 
are members of conference other than the SEC, Big 10, or Big12 that competes in either NCAA division I football or basketball. The 
row “All Division I Athletics” captures the proportion of CEO Alma Maters that are members of any conference that competes in 
either NCAA division I football or basketball. Amounts in parentheses under row differences (see column labeled “Difference”) are t-
statistics. *, ** and *** next to the coefficient estimates indicate a 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, significance level using two-tailed 
tests.  
 Suspect Control Difference 
    
Log of Distance (miles) 6.545 6.554 0.009 
   (0.05) 
    
Distance (miles) 901 1023 122 
   (0.71) 
    
 Suspect Control Difference 
    
Big Football Conferences 0.381 0.191 0.190 
   (1.80)* 
    
Division I without Big Football Conferences 0.143 0.191 -0.048 
   (0.50) 
    
All Division I Athletics 0.524 0.382 0.142 
   (1.15) 
